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The Concept of a Routine 
 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson 
 
 
The significance of routines in modern, learning, innovating economies is widely 
appreciated.1 Routines are vital to all organizations. Hence it is important to 
understand both how they can be built and how they can be changed. Such an 
appreciation is important, for analyzing how the business world works, for 
understanding how knowledge is retained and transferred, for the development of 
business strategy, and for the creation of policies to encourage more beneficial 
business practices. 
 
Detailed empirical investigation is essential in this regard, but detailed taxonomic 
studies based on empirical evidence are relatively rare. One reason why empirical 
investigations have so far remained rather limited is that the conceptual specification 
of a routine remains hazy. Greater conceptual precision is a vital precondition of 
fruitful empirical enquiry. 
The aim of this essay is help refine and define the concept of the routine, by citing 
relevant insights from philosophy, social theory and psychology, and by focusing on 
some milestone contributions in this area. The paper is divided into four sections. The 
first section addresses the analogous and component concept of habit, with a view to 
making a distinction between habits and routines. The second section explores the 
metaphor of ‘routines as genes’ and argues that routines must be treated as 
capacities or dispositions, rather than behaviours. The third section considers the 
mechanics of routine persistence and replication in more detail, by briefly discussing 
some important theoretical and empirical studies in the area. The fourth section 
concludes the essay. 
1. Habits as the Basis and Individual Analogue of Routines 
For two reasons, to understand the concept of a routine we need to appreciate the 
idea of a habit. First, routines operate through the triggering of individual habits. 
Second, routines are the organizational analogue of individual habits. So the analysis 
starts here with the habit concept.  
Like ‘routine’, the word ‘habit’ exists in common parlance and is taken to mean a 
variety of things. Both words need to be defined more precisely for scientific usage. 
Even in scientific circles, and especially since the rise of behaviourist psychology 
after the First World War, there has been some ambiguity in the definition of habit. 
The concept of habit was central to the pragmatist philosophy and institutional 
economics of the early twentieth century. It is useful to return to the meaning of the 
term employed then, especially as this earlier usage is now enjoying a revival. 
                                                 
1 Thanks are due to Markus Becker for useful comments on an earlier version of this essay. 
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Pragmatist philosophers and institutional economists such as Thorstein Veblen 
(1919) regarded habit as an acquired proclivity or capacity, which may or may not be 
actually expressed in current behaviour (Hodgson, 2004). Repeated behaviour is 
important in establishing a habit. But habit and behaviour are not the same. If we 
acquire a habit we do not necessarily use it all the time. It is a propensity to behave in 
a particular way in a particular class of situations. 
The pragmatist philosopher and psychologist William James (1892, p. 143) 
proclaimed: ‘Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious 
conservative agent.’ Similarly, the pragmatist sociologists William Thomas and 
Florian Znaniecki (1920, p. 1851) criticized ‘the indistinct use of the term “habit” to 
indicate any uniformities of behavior. … A habit … is the tendency to repeat the same 
act in similar material conditions.’ Also treating habit as a propensity, William 
McDougall (1908, p. 37) wrote of ‘acquired habits of thought and action’ as ‘springs of 
action’ and saw ‘habit as a source of impulse or motive power’. Elsewhere, in his 
defences against the behaviourist invasion in psychology, McDougall (1924) explicitly 
emphasized the conceptual difference between dispositions and behaviour. As the 
pragmatist philosopher and psychologist John Dewey (1922, p. 42) put it: ‘The 
essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response.’ The 
use of habit is largely unconscious. Habits are submerged repertoires of potential 
behaviour; they can be triggered or reinforced by an appropriate stimulus or context.2 
As the pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1878, p. 294) declared, the 
‘essence of belief is the establishment of habit’. Accordingly, habit is not the negation 
of deliberation, but its necessary foundation. Reasons and beliefs are often the 
rationalizations of deep-seated feelings and emotions that spring from habits that are 
laid down by repeated behaviours. This interplay of behaviour, habit, emotion and 
rationalization helps to explain the normative power of custom in human society. 
Hence ‘custom reconciles us to everything’ – as Edmund Burke wrote – and 
customary rules can acquire the force of moral authority. In turn, these moral norms 
help to further reinforce the institution in question. 
Habits are socially acquired, not genetically transmitted. By accepting the 
foundational role of habit in sustaining rule-following behaviour, we can begin to build 
an alternative ontology of institutions and routines, in which we avoid the conceptual 
problems of an account based primarily on intentionality. This is not to the deny the 
importance of intentionality, but to regard it as a consequence as much as a cause, 
and to place it in the broader context of other, non-deliberative behaviours. 
Importantly, all learning, and the attainment of all skills, depends on the acquisition 
of habits. Knowledge and skills involve the capacity to address a complex problem 
and to identify rapidly the means of dealing with it. Experience and intuition are 
crucial here, and these must be grounded in acquired habits of thought or behaviour 
that dispose the agent to identify the crucial aspects of or responses to the problem. 
All skills, from knowledge of mathematics through competence with languages to 
ability with a musical instrument, depend on habits. Habits are the necessary means 
of avoiding full reflection over every detail, so that the more deliberative levels of the 
                                                 
2 The conception of a habit as a propensity or disposition is also found in modern works such as Camic (1986), 
Margolis (1994), Murphy (1994), Kilpinen (2000) and others. 
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mind are freed up for more strategic issues. If all details were necessarily the subject 
of conscious deliberation, then the mind would be overwhelmed and paralyzed by 
minutiae. 
We may briefly consider two possible types of mechanism by which habit may be 
replicated from person to person.3 The first is by incentive or constraint. These can 
provide reasons to acquire specific customs, follow particular traffic conventions and 
use specific linguistic terms. In these cases, because others are acting in a particular 
way we can have powerful incentives to behave accordingly. In doing so, we too build 
up habits associated with these behaviours. The behaviours are reproduced and also 
the habits giving rise to them are replicated. 
Another possible mechanism is imitation. Imitation need not be fully conscious, and 
it will also involve some ‘tacit learning’ (Polanyi, 1967; Reber, 1993; Knudsen, 2002). 
Perhaps imitation can occur even without strong incentives, on the grounds that the 
propensity to imitate is instinctive, and this instinct has itself evolved for efficacious 
reasons among social creatures (James, 1892; Veblen, 1899; Campbell, 1975; Boyd 
and Richerson, 1985; Simon, 1990; Tomasello, 2000). However, an imitation instinct 
would require an existing set of common behaviours in the group, otherwise an 
emerging propensity to imitate might not have a selection advantage. For instinctive 
imitation to take off, common behaviours may have to emerge for other reasons. 
Furthermore, if imitation is more than mimicry, then the rules and understandings 
associated with it also have to be transmitted. Imitation is more problematic than it 
appears. Nevertheless, there are provisional grounds to consider a partially 
instinctive propensity to imitate as a strong element in the complex social glue, and 
hence a force behind the replication of habits. 
Having established the concept of habit, and for reasons that should become 
clearer below, we are now in a stronger position to turn to the concept of a routine. In 
the following section it will be explained how routines play a similar role for 
organizations that habits play for individuals. 
2. Routines as Organizational Genes 
In everyday parlance the word ‘routine’ is used loosely to refer to repeated 
sequences of behaviour, by individuals as well as by organizations. However, when 
Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982) used the concept in their seminal work on 
economic and organizational evolution, and repeated the metaphor of ‘routines as 
genes’, they suggested a more specific and technical meaning for the term. It is 
important to clarify and refine this technical meaning. 
A consensus has now emerged that routines relate to groups or organizations, 
whereas habits relate to individuals (Cohen et al., 1996; Dosi et al., 2000). Individuals 
have habits; groups have routines. Routines are the organizational analogue of 
habits. But routines do not simply refer to habits that are shared by many individuals 
in an organization or group. Routines are not themselves habits: they are 
organizational meta-habits, existing on a substrate of habituated individuals in a 
social structure. Routines are one ontological layer above habits themselves. 
                                                 
3 See the more extensive discussion in Hodgson and Knudsen (unpublished a). 
 - 5 - 
Having established the analogy between habits and routines, in the next section 
the causal connection between the two will be examined in more detail. It is first 
necessary to address an important question concerning the nature of routines: are 
they organizational dispositions or organizational behaviours?  
Some confusion persists on this question. In their 1982 book, Nelson and Winter 
sometimes treat routines as dispositions, but otherwise described them as 
behaviours. For example, Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 15) write: ‘It is that most of 
what is regular and predictable about business behavior is plausibly subsumed under 
the heading “routine”’. But they go on in the same sentence to describe routines as 
‘dispositions … that shape the approach of the firm’ to problems. Routines are also 
treated as ‘organizational memory’, which refers more to capabilities than to 
behaviour. 
Another passage introduces the useful analogy between a routine and a computer 
program, but repeats the same confusion. Nelson and Winter (1982, p. 97) see a 
‘routine’ as being like a computer ‘program’, referring thereby ‘to a repetitive pattern 
of activity in an entire organization’ as well as to skills or capacities. But there is a 
difference between a computer program and the computer’s output or behaviour. The 
computer program is a rule-based system, with a generative coding that, along with 
other inputs, determines the computer’s output or behaviour. Nelson and Winter 
conflate generative and dispositional factors such as the computer program with 
outputs such a ‘repetitive pattern of activity’ or ‘performance’. 
Nelson and Winter (1982) refer repeatedly to ‘routines as genes’. This is another 
useful analogy. But of course, routines are very different from genes. Routines do not 
replicate biologically and they are much less enduring. All analogies are inexact in 
some respects and must be handled with care, as Nelson and Winter are fully aware. 
The gene analogy usefully points to routines as relatively durable carriers of 
information through shorter periods of time, with the algorithmic capacity to generate 
particular outcomes in given circumstances. Routines are like genes in the sense that 
they are both generative, rule-like structures and potentialities. However, routines 
(like genes) cannot be both generative structures and outcomes of such structures. 
This point is not about the appropriateness or otherwise of biological analogies, but 
about the clear meanings of words and their ontological references. 
Winter (1995, pp. 149-50) distinguishes between a ‘routine in operation at a 
particular site ... a web of coordinating relationships connecting specific resources’ 
and the ‘routine per se – the abstract activity pattern’. But the one term ‘routine’ 
cannot apply to both the ‘web of coordinating relationships’ and the ‘activity pattern’ 
that is the outcome of the coordinating structure and its environmental triggers; it 
cannot usefully denote both potentiality and actuality. It has to denote one or the 
other, but not both. 
At root there is a philosophical problem here, which is worthy of brief discussion. 
Basically, the essence of what an entity is cannot be entirely appraised in terms of 
what an entity does. If we make this confusion, then we wrongly imply that when the 
entity interrupts its characteristic activity, it ceases to exist. Birds fly. But what defines 
a bird is the (existing or past) capacity to fly, not flying itself. If a bird were wrongly 
defined as a flying animal, then any bird sitting on a branch or pecking on the ground 
would cease to be a bird. 
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Accordingly routines are not behaviour; they are stored behavioural capacities or 
capabilities. Consider a firm in which all employees and managers work between 
9am and 5pm only. During this working day a number of organizational routines can 
be energized. At other times the firm is inactive. But the routines do not all disappear 
at 5pm, to reappear mysteriously the next day. The routines-as-capacities remain, as 
long as the individuals have the capacity and disposition to work again together in the 
same context. Subject to this condition, the routines can be triggered the next day by 
appropriate stimuli. 
Aristotle made the central philosophical point here, more than 2300 years ago. In 
his Metaphysics Aristotle (1956, pp. 227-8) criticized Eucleides of Megara – a disciple 
of Socrates – and his school 
who maintain that a thing can act only when it is acting. But the paradoxes 
attending this view are not far to seek. … Now if a man cannot have an art 
without having at some time learned it, and cannot later be without it unless he 
has lost it, are we to suppose that the moment he stops building he has lost his 
art? If so, how will he have recovered it if he immediately resumes building? The 
same is true of inanimate objects. … The Megaric view, in fact, does away with 
all change. On their theory that which stands will always stand, that which sits 
will always sit; … Since we cannot admit this view … we must obviously draw a 
distinction between potentiality and actuality. 
An enduringly relevant point here is that definitions or ontologies that are based on 
behaviour cannot cope with instances where the behaviour changes or ceases. But 
the capacity to produce the original characteristic behaviour remains, and this 
capacity, not the outcome, defines the essence of the entity. Although ancient, this 
point is not arcane; it is widely utilized in modern realist philosophy of science. 
Central to most strands of modern realist philosophy is the distinction between the 
potential and the actual, between dispositions and outcomes, where in each case the 
former are more fundamental than the latter. 
Science is about the discovery of causal laws or principles. Causes are not events; 
they are generative mechanisms that can under specific conditions give rise to 
specific events. For example, a force impinging on an object does not always make 
that object move. The outcome also depends on friction, countervailing forces, and 
other factors. Causes relate to potentialities; they are not necessarily realized in 
outcomes. As Veblen (1919, p. 89) put it: ‘The laws of nature are … of the nature of a 
propensity.’ Hence there must be a distinction between an observed empirical 
regularity and any causal law that lies behind it. Similarly there must be a distinction 
between the capacities and behaviours of an entity.4 
In biology, genes and genotypes are wholly potentialities; they are not behaviours. 
In the socio-economic domain, the closest things to genotypes are the generative 
rule-like structures inherent in ingrained individual habits and in organizational 
routines. Habits and routines are thus understood as conditional, rule-like 
potentialities or dispositions, rather than behaviour as such. The key distinction in the 
                                                 
4 For realist accounts upholding a distinction between generative mechanisms or causal powers, on the one hand, 
and outcomes or events, on the other, see for example Bhaskar (1975), Harré and Madden (1975), Popper 
(1990). 
 - 7 - 
socio-economic sphere is between habits and routines as dispositions, on the one 
hand, and manifest behaviour, on the other hand. 
In this light, any emphasis on the allegedly predictable character of routines is 
misplaced. Predictions relate to outcomes or events, not to causal laws, rules or 
generative structures. The moderately dependable feature of a routine, rule or 
computer program is not one of predictability but of durability. Routines (or rules or 
computer programs) are usually conditional on other inputs or events. As a result any 
predictability does not stem from the routine alone but from the predictability of these 
other inputs. For example, a firm may have a fixed mark-up pricing routine of adding 
20 per cent to the unit cost of its products. If costs were capricious and highly 
variable, as they might be under some circumstances, then the resulting price would 
be equally unreliable. The relatively enduring and persistent quality of a routine is not 
its outcome but its generative, rule-like structure. 
While a consensus has been established that a routine is an organizational rather 
than an individual phenomenon, some confusion remains on the above points, and 
this has led to some conceptual and empirical difficulties.5 Some of these difficulties 
can be overcome by consistently treating a routine as an organizational capacity and 
generative structure, analogous to biological genes or computer programs, but 
having distinctive features of their own. 
To their credit, both Nelson and Winter are now more inclined to describe the 
routine in terms of a capacity. Nelson and Winter (2002, p. 30) write: ‘we treat 
organizational routine as the organizational analogue of individual skill.’ A similar 
attitude is evident elsewhere. Barbara Levitt and James March (1988, p. 320) write: 
‘The generic term “routines” includes the forms, rules, procedures, conventions, 
strategies, and technologies around which organizations are constructed and through 
which they operate.’ Another useful definition of a routine as a potentiality or 
capability, rather than behaviour, is found in the discussion in Michael Cohen et al. 
(1996, p. 683) ‘A routine is an executable capability for repeated performance in 
some context that [has] been learned by an organization in response to selective 
pressures.’ 
A routine is here defined as a generative structure or capacity within an 
organization. Routines are organizational dispositions to energize conditional 
patterns of behaviour within an organized group of individuals, involving sequential 
responses to cues. The next section raises the general questions of how routines 
work within organizations and how they carry information. 
3. How do Routines Carry Information? 
The analysis of how routines endure and replicate is enormous and incomplete 
(Hodgson, 2003). At present, our general understanding is limited, and progress 
depends largely on the accumulation of detailed case studies. As Winter (1990, p. 
270) notes, so far ‘little attention has been paid to the mechanism by which whatever-
it-is-called is transmitted’ and to its ‘replication mechanism’. For Winter (1990, p. 294 
n.) this amounts to a regrettable ‘vagueness on a key issue’. As Winter (1990, pp. 
                                                 
5 For discussions of some of these difficulties see Cohen et al. (1996), Becker (2001) and Lazaric (2000). 
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270-5) insisted: ‘The question of what is “inherited” and how the inheritance 
mechanisms works is, however, ... central and ... far from definitive resolution … To 
develop the routines as genes approach fully, the problem of inheritance 
mechanisms needs to be dealt with convincingly.’ 
To understand how routines work it is necessary to consider how any tacit or other 
information associated with a routine is preserved and replicated. A very useful study 
in this regard is by Michael Cohen and Paul Bacdayan (1994). They use the 
distinction in psychology between procedural and other, more cognitive forms of 
memory, such as semantic, episodic or declarative memory. As psychologists Endel 
Tulving and Daniel Schacter (1990, p. 301) put it: 
The domain of procedural memory is behavior, whereas that of semantic and 
episodic memory is cognition or thought. Cognitive memory systems have the 
capability of modeling the external world – that is, of storing representations of 
objects, events, and relations among them – whereas procedural memory does 
not have this capacity. 
Procedural memory is triggered by preceding events and stimuli. It typically leads to 
behavioural responses and has a major tacit component. It is potential action that is 
energized by social or other cues. ‘Procedural knowledge is less subject to decay, 
less explicitly accessible, and less easy to transfer to novel circumstances’ (Cohen 
and Bacdayan, 1994, p. 557). 
Routines depend upon a structured group of individuals, each with habits of a 
particular kind, where many of these habits depend upon procedural memory. The 
behavioural cues by some members of a structured assembly of habituated 
individuals triggers specific habits in others. Hence various individual habits sustain 
each other in an interlocking structure of reciprocating individual behaviours. 
Together these behaviours take on collective qualities associated with teams. But 
both individuals and structures are involved throughout. The organization or group 
provides a structured social and physical environment for each individual, including 
rules and norms of behaviour, of both the explicit and the informal kind. This 
environment is made up of the other individuals, the relations between them and the 
technological and physical artefacts that they may use in their interactions. This 
social and physical environment enables, stimulates and channels individual 
activities, which in turn can help trigger the behaviour of others, produce or modify 
some artefacts, and help to change or replicate parts of this social and physical 
environment. 
Partly because of procedural memory, organizations can have important additional 
properties and capacities that are not possessed by individuals, taken severally. The 
organization provides the social and physical environment that is necessary to enable 
specific activities, cue individual habits and deploy individual memories. If one person 
leaves the organization and is replaced by another, then the new recruit may have to 
learn the habits that are required to maintain specific routines. Just as the human 
body has a life in addition to its constituent cells, the organization thus has a life in 
addition to its members. The organizational whole is greater than the sum of the 
properties its individual members, taken severally. The additional properties of the 
whole stem from the structured relations and causal interactions between the 
individuals involved (Blitz, 1992; Hodgson, 2004; Wiessman, 2000). 
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A routine derives from the capacity of an organization to provide conditions to 
energize a series of conditional, interlocking, sequential behaviours among several 
individuals within the organization. Cohen and Bacdayan (1994, p. 557) write: ‘The 
routine of a group can be viewed as the concatenation of such procedurally stored 
actions, each primed by and priming the actions of others.’ This statement captures 
the dependence of routines on procedural memory, but is somewhat ambiguous 
concerning the genotypic or phenotypic status of a routine. 
As argued above, routines are not behaviour; they are stored behavioural 
capacities or capabilities. These capacities involve knowledge and memory. They 
involve organizational structures and individual habits which, when triggered, lead to 
sequential behaviours. But this does not mean that a routine can be fully codified. 
Routines are not necessarily nominal, codified or officially approved procedures. 
Routines generally rely on informal and tacit knowledge, and this fact is clearly 
relevant for understanding their replication. 
The temporal durability of routines and the way that they can embody knowledge 
‘forgotten’ by individuals is illustrated by an anecdote related by Elting Morison 
(1966). A time-and-motion expert was studying film footage of Second World War 
motorized artillery crews. He was puzzled by a recurring three-second pause just 
before the guns were fired. An old soldier also watching the film suddenly realized 
that the three-second pause had originated from the earlier era in which the guns 
were drawn by horses, and the horses had to be held and calmed in the seconds just 
before the guns went off. Despite its eventual redundancy, this part of the routine had 
survived the transition from horse-driven to motorized artillery. Part of the knowledge 
held in a routine can become obsolete, yet still be reproduced, like the examples of 
‘rudimentary organs’ discussed by Charles Darwin (1859, pp. 450-8). 
Just as habits replicate from individual to individual, routines replicate from group to 
group and from organization to organization. In studies of technological diffusion, 
organization studies, and the strategic management literature there is some 
discussion of the diffusion or replication of routines (Aldrich and Martinez, 2003; 
Becker and Lazaric, 2003; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hannan and Freeman, 1984, 
1989; Lazaric and Denis, 2001; Levitt and March, 1988; Rogers, 1995; Stinchcombe, 
1990; Szulanski 1996, 2000; Zucker, 1987). Prominent mechanisms for the 
replication of routines involve the movement of employees from organization to 
organization, or independent experts or consultants that help to transfer knowledge 
and experience gained in one context to another. The above authors cite case 
studies involving the transfer of technologies, management procedures, corporate 
multidivisional structures, accounting conventions and much else. What is central to 
these transfers is the replication of practices and organizational relationships. What is 
generally critical is the capacity of the receiving organization to accommodate and 
utilize these practices and relationships in the context of its own ingrained culture of 
habits and beliefs. 
In some respects the replication of routines may be more difficult than the 
replication of habits from individual to individual. Take the mechanism of imitation. 
Among individuals, any evolved capacity to imitate others must involve the ability to 
sense the more significant actions, and the tacit rules and meanings associated with 
behaviour. This capacity would have evolved over millions of years. By contrast, 
complex organizations are extremely recent in human history. Many organizations 
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may have evolved only limited capacities to discern and prioritize the important rules 
and meanings. It is likely that replication through imitation is even more difficult with 
(and at the level of) organizations than it is with individuals. 
Nevertheless, as noted in the organization studies literature, many examples of 
successful routine replication exist. They typically involve the combination of 
codifiable information and instructions with extensive personal example, advice and 
contact, where the receiving organization has sufficient plasticity to usefully absorb 
and accommodate the routine. Sometimes routines are spread as a result of laws or 
rules that emanate from a third organization, such as the state or an association of 
employers. Otherwise the replication of routines can occur as the result of the 
strategy of its receiving organization, or it can result from lower-level contact, 
stimulation and imitation. Routines replicate, and they do so on a substrate of 
organized and habituated individuals. 
There is an important and ongoing debate concerning the degree of durability of 
routines. Michael Hannan and John Freeman (1989) are leading proponents of the 
view that the capacity to change routines within organizations is relatively limited, and 
that changes in the population of routines within industries or societies largely comes 
about through the survival or extinction of specific organizations, and the 
consequence persistence or disappearance of the routines they carry, rather than 
through modifications in the routines themselves. This is an important area of 
ongoing enquiry.6 
This raises theoretical and empirical questions concerning how routines are 
selected and the structures they require in order to survive. One approach is to 
establish in this context the general distinction between a ‘replicator’ and an 
‘interactor’, as found in the philosophy of evolutionary systems (Hull, 1988). It is 
beyond the scope of this essay to go into details, but the key points can be 
summarized in brief. In a general and meaningful sense, routines may be regarded 
as replicators, because when routines are copied they satisfy the necessary basic 
criteria of causation, similarity and information transfer (Godfrey-Smith, 2000; 
Sperber, 2000; Hodgson, 2003). What then are the corresponding interactors? David 
Hull (1988, p. 408) defines an interactor as ‘an entity that directly interacts as a 
cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes 
replication to be differential’. The term ‘cohesive whole’ indicates that its components 
stick together and remain united. This must mean at least that all the components 
depend critically on the survival of the whole, and that to some degree the 
components depend on the survival of each other. Refining this definition still further, 
Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen (2004) argue that a firm may be regarded 
as an interactor, and consequently as a ‘vehicle’ for its inherent habits and routines. 
The fate of a routine is often dependent on the fate of its host firm. It should be 
pointed out, however, that although this type of evolutionary approach has a long 
history (Hodgson, 2004), at least in its present form and context it is in the early 
stages of its development, and many outstanding conceptual problems remain to be 
resolved. 
                                                 
6 Usher and Evans (1996) provide a useful review of this literature, with further evidence. However, it has been 
argued elsewhere that their characterization of this debate as between ‘Darwinian’ and ‘Lamarckian’ concepts of 
change is at best highly misleading (Hodgson and Knudsen, unpublished b). 
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4. Conclusion 
This essay has explored the concept of a routine in fundamental terms, using insights 
from philosophy, psychology and social theory. A routine is here defined as a 
generative structure or capacity within an organization. By definition, routines are 
organizational dispositions to energize conditional patterns of behaviour within an 
organized group of individuals, involving sequential responses to cues. There are 
important philosophical reasons, endorsed by modern philosophy of science, why 
routines should be defined as organizational dispositions or capacities, rather than 
behaviour as such. 
Just as habits relate to individuals, routines relate to organizations. Both are 
socially transmitted dispositions, formed through repeated behaviours. Routines 
themselves are structures of interlocking individual habits. But routines are more than 
mere aggregations of habits, because they also depend on the emergent properties 
of organization itself, emanating from structured causal relations and interactions 
between individuals. 
One of the reasons why the study of routines is important for the study of business 
practice is that they are repositories and carriers of knowledge and skill. The routine 
is often the means through which individual skills are triggered and energized. One 
psychological mechanism that is important here is procedural memory, which means 
that some powers of recall can be enhanced when triggered by cues provided by 
others. In this manner the routine as a whole becomes more than the sum of the 
capacities of the individuals involved, taken severally. 
Without going into details, this essay has pointed to a further agenda of conceptual 
enquiry, inspired by evolutionary principles taken from the modern philosophy of 
biology. In theoretical, conceptual and empirical terms, the study of routines offers an 
exciting agenda for future research. 
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